Climate Change Mitigation: How Effective is Green Quantitative Easing?*

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Abstract

We develop a two sector integrated assessment model with incomplete markets to analyze the effectiveness of green quantitative easing in complementing fiscal policies for climate change mitigation. We model green quantitative easing through a given outstanding stock of bonds held by a monetary authority and its portfolio allocation between a clean (green) and a dirty (brown) sector of production. Our key research question is whether the monetary authority can effectively contribute to a reduction of global damages caused by carbon emissions. Our findings show that green quantitative easing does not lead to a perfect crowding out of capital and thus has real effects in the long-run. Since it only indirectly affects the allocation of production to dirty and clean technologies and since its overall economic size is relatively small, green quantitative easing is, however, a less effective climate change mitigating policy instrument than carbon taxes. We conclude that green quantitative easing might be a quantitatively important complement to fiscal policies if governments only insufficiently coordinate on implementing green fiscal policies.

Keywords: Climate Change; Integrated Assessment Model; 2-Sector Model; Green Quantitative Easing; Carbon Taxation

J.E.L. Classification Codes: E51; E62; Q54

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Non-technical Summary

This paper examines whether central banks—a monetary authority—can effectively contribute to a mitigation of global warming through green quantitative easing, i.e., through a shift of a monetary authorities’ asset holdings towards the green sector of the economy. As a secondary question we further investigate the effectiveness of this policy in combination with fiscal policies—set by a fiscal authority—, more precisely, a carbon tax.

In our setup, green quantitative easing refers to a change in the portfolio allocation of a given outstanding stock of bonds held by the monetary authority, which is directed towards bonds issued by the green sector over those issued by the brown (CO2-emitting) sector.

To answer the question how effective green quantitative easing can be, we develop a quantitative integrated assessment model with green and brown capital. In our model, aggregate output is produced employing intermediate goods that are in turn produced in the dirty (brown) sector and in the clean (green) sector. Intermediate goods are produced using capital, labour and energy as inputs, with the brown sector using dirty (carbon-based) energy and the green sector using other (clean) energy. Markets do not take future climate damages into account and therefore rely too much on the brown sector for the production of intermediate goods in the absence of policy interventions. Over time, this negative production externality leads to a reduction of total output as the global temperature increases.

Capital and labour are supplied to the intermediate firms by households, which allocate their savings between bonds issued by the two intermediate sectors (green and brown). The return on the capital used in the firms is stochastic, which presents an income risk for the households seeking to optimise their consumption over time. This feature of the model is of central importance as it realistically implies that, in response to the portfolio allocation decision by the monetary authority private households will not perfectly reallocate their portfolios towards brown assets. Therefore, in our model, the portfolio reallocation decision by the monetary authority is not neutralized by private household reactions.

In this model setting, without policy intervention, the global temperature increases by 3.5 degree Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 2100. This is in line with IPCC scenarios of climate change and well above the Paris agreement targets to mitigate global warming.

Next we simulate three policy experiments. First, we model the effect of carbon pricing by a fiscal authority, which increases the price of dirty energy through a carbon tax. Second, we consider the contribution of green quantitative easing, were the monetary authority changes the composition of its private asset portfolio to only green bonds. Finally, we consider both policies

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1 An integrated assessment model unites a macroeconomic perspective with the possible damages of climate change, which are modelled as future output losses due to an increasing temperature that caused by the build-up of carbon emissions in the atmosphere.
in combination. Since our model is calibrated to the world, as global warming knows no borders, these simulated fiscal and monetary policies would require cooperation across countries that we abstract from.

The initial carbon tax is 50 US dollars per ton of carbon in 2021 (equivalent to 13.6 USD per ton of CO2). We hold the implied tax rate constant along the transition and find that the global temperature increase could be reduced by 0.1 degrees of Celsius, compared to the baseline. This carbon tax is at the low end of many policy proposals to meet the Paris agreement, and chosen to facilitate the comparison with green quantitative easing.\(^2\) Green quantitative easing is modeled as a stylized scenario where the monetary authority’s private capital portfolio, which is initially proportionally split across both sectors, is reallocated to clean capital only. This additional supply of clean capital reduces its return, but since clean and brown capital are assumed not to be perfectly correlated households will find it optimal to only partially reallocate their savings to brown capital. As a net effect, the capital stock employed for production in the clean sector will thus increase relative to the capital stock in the dirty sector, which triggers a relative increase of labour demand in the clean sector and a relative expansion of its output. The monetary authority can thus influence the relative production across the two sectors in the economy through the allocation of its asset portfolio.

Our green quantitative easing simulation is set up to investigate its maximum possible effect. We assume a complete and immediate switch to green bonds, no uncertainty about the classification of green and brown bonds and the share of private assets held by the monetary authority is calibrated to 10 percent of GDP by including asset backed securities as well as commercial bonds. Despite this calibration tailored to achieve the maximum possible effect, the impact of green quantitative easing is rather modest compared to a carbon tax of initially (only) 13.6 USD per ton of CO2. We find that the emission reduction through this carbon tax is about 4-times larger than the maximum reduction that could be achieved through the ambitiously calibrated green quantitative easing policy. Put differently, to achieve the same effect this maximum reduction through green quantitative easing, we would require a carbon tax of only about 3 USD per ton of CO2.

When combining both policies, we find that green quantitative easing complements fiscal policy, i.e., green quantitative easing on top of a carbon tax will induce an additional reduction of the increase of global temperature. However, the whole is less than the sum of its parts: the marginal effect of the two policies in combination is lower than in isolation. Within the brown sector, a carbon tax increases the production costs of energy relative to the costs of capital and labour, which triggers a less energy intensive production. Green quantitative easing increases the

\(^2\)Since there is no aggregate uncertainty in our model, an equivalent fiscal policy would be to set a carbon price through an emission trading scheme.
costs of brown capital, which partially leads to a more energy intensive production. Thus, both policies partially counteract each other.

We conclude that green quantitative easing may be an effective complementary policy instrument, in particular if governments around the world fail to coordinate on introducing a sizeable carbon tax or equivalent carbon pricing through other fiscal policies.
1 Introduction

Climate change evoked by mankind will be one of the greatest global challenges in the next decades. Since pre-industrial times, global temperature has increased by approximately 1.1 degrees of Celsius as a result of carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions IPCC (2021). If this trend were to continue, extreme weather events would not only become more frequent—causing large macroeconomic costs—but the world would also observe irreversible global environmental damages. To effectively reverse this trend, ambitious policy measures need to be adopted as the window of opportunity to act is closing rapidly. While there is broad consensus on the effectiveness and usefulness of carbon pricing as a policy tool to combat climate change, even though views differ on the optimal level, recently a vivid debate emerged on whether and how central banks should play a role in addressing climate change.

This paper examines whether central banks—which we throughout the paper refer to as a monetary authority—can contribute to mitigate climate change through green quantitative easing (QE). Our key research question is whether a portfolio shift of the monetary authority towards the green sector of the economy can effectively reduce climate change and how this compares with fiscal mitigation policies, such as a carbon tax. In our setup, green QE refers to the portfolio allocation of a given outstanding stock of bonds held by the monetary authority, which is tilted towards bonds issued by a clean (green) sector of production over those issued by a dirty (carbon-emitting) sector of production.

To address our research question, we develop a two-sector quantitative integrated assessment model where aggregate output is produced employing clean and dirty sectoral intermediate goods. Markets are incomplete for two reasons. First, households face risky asset returns in the two intermediate goods sectors and can self insure against this risk by saving in a risk-free bond. Second, there exists a climate change externality leading to a reduction of total output. The model is calibrated to a world economy with one monetary and one fiscal authority, which comes along with the implicit assumption that both these authorities coordinate on the introduction of a global carbon tax and green QE.

Intermediate goods in the economy are produced using capital and labour, and either clean or dirty energy as inputs. Energy production itself takes place using a simple technology employing some exogenously growing technology level and labour as the only inputs. Dirty energy production leads to an accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere, which causes an increase of the global temperature leading to a damage to aggregate output, a standard production externality frequently employed in the climate change literature.

Households live until infinity and maximize their expected discounted life-time utility over consumption streams. Every household runs two intermediate goods firms in the two sectors by
employing its own household capital and by hiring labour and energy on the respective labour and energy market. Since the return processes on capital in the two firms is stochastic, households are heterogeneous, with their heterogeneity resulting from different (histories of) return realizations. This return risk is idiosyncratic, thus there is no aggregate risk in the economy. Importantly, the shocks on the returns of the two capital stocks are imperfectly correlated, both across sectors and over time. Households not only hire labour on the market for production, but also exogenously supply their own labour on the market and from this labour supply they earn a deterministic wage income. Given these income processes households solve a consumption savings problem and choose to allocate their savings between the two capital stocks as well as a risk-free bond that is assumed to be in zero net supply across households.

In this model setting, we simulate the transition of the economy over the next decades—from 2020 to 2100—and compute the resulting temperature increase. As a baseline scenario, we assume a carbon tax of zero and a constant ratio of assets held by the central bank of 4 percent of the value of the economy’s capital stock which is split proportionally across the two intermediate goods sectors. While we do not model the rationale for such a long-run QE policy, our assumption can be interpreted as approximating a real world economy in which QE policies take place with a certain regularity. Our ad-hoc approach is based on the insight that demographic and climate change processes will likely lead to a persistently low interest rate environment—which our simulations also show—and it is therefore not unlikely that such unconventional monetary policies will be implemented again in future recessions. In this baseline scenario, the global temperature increases until 2100 to about 3.5 above pre-industrial levels. This is in line with the IPCC scenarios of climate change and well above the Paris agreement targets of 1.5 degrees.

Next, we consider three policy experiments. First, we model the effects of carbon pricing by a fiscal authority, which increases the price of dirty energy.\footnote{Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, setting the carbon price through an emission trading scheme would be equivalent to a carbon tax.} We introduce the carbon tax in year 2020 at an initially rather low level of 50 USD per ton of carbon emissions, which corresponds to a tax of 13.6 USD per ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) and to an ad valorem carbon tax of 6.6 percent. We hold this tax rate constant along the transition and find that with this tax rate in place the global temperature increase would be reduced by 0.17 degrees of Celsius, compared to the baseline.

Second, we consider a stylised green QE policy. We assume that the monetary authority changes the composition of its private asset portfolio to only green bonds, i.e., the maximum reduction. The assumed reallocation of the monetary authority’s portfolio towards the clean sector increases the capital stock employed for production in that sector relative to the capital stock in the dirty sector. This triggers a relative increase of labour demand in the clean sector and
a relative expansion of output. The monetary authority can thus influence the relative production across the two sectors in the economy. We find that the global temperature reduction achieved through such a strong green QE policy is about 4 times smaller than what would be achieved by a rather limited carbon tax of only 13.6 USD per ton of CO2. Put differently, it would only require a tax of about 3 USD per ton of CO2 to achieve the same reduction of the global temperature as under our strong green QE policy. Thus, green QE is a substantially less effective policy instrument to mitigate climate change damages, compared to a carbon tax.

Third, we consider the two policies, carbon taxation and green QE, in combination and examine whether they are substitutes or complements. We find that green QE complements fiscal policy, i.e., green QE on top of a carbon tax will induce an additional reduction of the increase of global temperature. However, the whole is less than the sum of its parts: the marginal effect of the two policies in combination is lower than in isolation. The reason is that the impact of the increase in dirty capital costs through green QE is partly diminished by shifts of input factors in the intermediate sector induced by the carbon tax.

Importantly, a reallocation of capital by the monetary authority from dirty to clean intermediate goods in our model only leads to a partial crowding out of private capital in the clean sector. In other words, the reallocation of private capital towards the dirty sector will be lower than the monetary authority’s portfolio shift towards the clean sector. The reason for this partial crowding out is the assumed imperfect correlation of returns, which means that from a portfolio choice allocation perspective it will not be optimal for households to fully reallocate their capital.

Our results are robust against several sensitivity experiments, such as a stronger reduction in the share of emissions per unit of GDP and a decline in the working-age population over time according for reasons of population ageing. If we assume, however, that the level of assets held by the monetary authority is constant along the transition such that share of assets held relative to the global capital stock converges to zero and assume the same portfolio reallocation in the green QE policy, then green QE is about 15 times less effective than the assumed carbon tax of 13.6 USD per ton of CO2. An additional crucial parameter we look at in our sensitivity analyses is the calibrated elasticity of the ratio of energy inputs with respect to the energy price ratio, which in our baseline we calibrate to a value of 2. With an elasticity of 1, the temperature reduction achieved by our extreme green QE would be very mild and the effect of the assumed carbon tax of 13.6 USD per ton of CO2 would be about 30 times larger.

In conclusion, we find that a carbon tax induced reduction of the increase of global temperature is significantly larger than the reduction induced by green QE. While a portfolio reallocation by the monetary authority towards the clean intermediate sector can contribute to a reduction in climate change damages, this is a much less effective policy instrument than carbon taxation. However,
green QE can usefully complement a carbon tax, in particular if governments only insufficiently coordinate on implementing green fiscal policies.

**Relation to Existing Literature**

Our infinitely lived agents integrated assessment model follows the tradition since William Nordhaus (cf. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) for a detailed description) and borrows elements from Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2014) and Van Der Ploeg and Rezai (2021), in particular with respect to the calibration of the climate module. We add two central features to this existing literature. First, we extend this work by exogenously modeling green QE through the monetary authority. Second, output in the two sectors of the economy is plausibly stochastic and the returns to capital are imperfectly correlated. The portfolio choice of private households is a crucial mechanism so that the green QE policy by the monetary authority is not perfectly neutralized on private markets. Throughout, we maintain the long-run focus of prototypical integrated assessment models and thus analyze a stylized long-run green QE policy.

This long-run focus distinguishes our approach from other contributions on green QE such as, e.g., Ferrari and Landi (2020) and Benmir and Roman (2020), who study climate policies along the business cycle by combining a climate model with a New Keynesian DSGE model with the financial accelerator framework of Gertler and Karadi (2011). As we do, they understand green QE as a tilting of the portfolio held by the central bank towards the green sector. Ferrari and Landi (2020) avoid a perfect crowding out by introducing costly portfolio rebalancing for private agents. They find limited effects of green QE on climate change. The reason is that their perspective is on the business cycle horizon whereas climate change unfolds at longer horizons.

By modeling idiosyncratic return risk our work also relates to the standard incomplete markets literature in quantitative macroeconomics pioneered in so-called Aiyagari-Bewley-Huggett-Imrohoroglu models (Bewley 1986; Huggett 1993; Aiyagari 1994; Imrohoroglu 1989). More specifically, our model adopts the setup of Angeletos (2007) to a two sector economy with a climate module. The Angeletos (2007) by building on the early work of Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) gives rise to closed form solutions of the household decision functions, which is a convenient property of the model as it allows us to compute the solution over very long horizons in our rather complex model in limited time.

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4 In our initial equilibrium calibration, we assume that the monetary authority holds assets in the clean and dirty sector in equal proportion. However, the empirical evidence in Papoutsi, Piazzesi, and Schneider (2021) suggests that the current asset holdings are rather biased towards dirty sectors. In this respect—and only in this respect—we likely underestimate the potential climate impact of an extreme shift of the portfolio allocation.

5 Besides considering the use of green QE to permanently lower emissions, Ferrari and Landi (2020) find that an aggressive expansion of green QE (i.e., selling dirty and buying clean assets) during expansions is welfare improving. Related, Benmir, Jaccard, and Vermandel (2020) find that optimal carbon taxes should be pro-cyclical.
Through the two sector risky return setup of our model we also link to the literature on asset pricing and climate change, e.g., by Hambel, Kraft, and van der Ploeg (2020) who emphasize the trade off between asset diversification and climate change mitigation. They further show that green assets feature higher risk premia than brown assets. The recent empirical literature indeed partially finds lower risk premia for green assets. Bolton and Kacperczyk (2020a) and Bolton and Kacperczyk (2020b) analyze the US, respectively the worldwide, stock markets and find a positive carbon premium that has been rising over the recent years. Kapraun and Scheins (2019) investigate a large dataset of government and corporate bonds. In the primary market, they find that green bonds have lower yields than non-green bonds. However, in the secondary market this reverses and they find green bonds featuring higher yields. Degryse, Goncharenko, Theunisz, and Vadazs (2020) investigate an international sample of syndicated loans and find that green firms borrow at significantly lower spreads. For sake of parsimony, we sidestep these aspects and are agnostic about any mechanisms that may lead to differential asset returns by calibrating our model to equal mean returns and equal return variances in both sectors.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 discusses the calibration. Section 4 presents our main results and Section 5 concludes the paper. Detailed derivations are contained in the appendix.

2 A Two-Sector Integrated Assessment Model

We develop a two sector world economy integrated assessment model with a monetary and a fiscal authority. Figure 1 provides an overview of the various sectors and entities in the economy, and Table 1 collects the main indices used throughout. The final consumption good is produced by a dirty and a clean intermediate goods sector, which itself uses capital, labour and energy as input. Labour is supplied by households and capital is supplied by households and a monetary authority. Energy is supplied by a dirty and a clean energy production sector, using labour supplied by households as input. We take the total capital stock of the monetary authority supplied to firms as given and thus the monetary authority solely faces a portfolio choice allocation problem and can thereby influence the production of clean and dirty intermediate inputs. Profits generated by the monetary authority flow to the fiscal authority which additionally raises revenue from households by consumption taxes and from dirty energy production by energy (carbon) taxes. Dirty energy production leads via its emissions to an accumulation of a carbon stock in the atmosphere which creates a temperature increase and with it causes a damage through a reduction of aggregate output. We now describe the main elements of the model in more detail.
Figure 1: Overview of the 2 Sector Integrated Assessment Model

Table 1: Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$t$</td>
<td>$t \in {0, 1, \ldots, \infty}$</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i$</td>
<td>$i \in {1, 2, \ldots, \infty}$</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s$</td>
<td>$s \in {cl, di}$</td>
<td>Sector ($clean, dirty$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c$</td>
<td>$c \in {ra, sl}$</td>
<td>Carbon Stocks ($rapidly, slowly$ depreciating stock)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: List of indices used in the integrated assessment model.
2.1 Time, Risk and Population Structure

Time in the model is discrete and runs from \( t = 0, \ldots, \infty \). At time \( t = 0 \) a continuous distribution of infinitely lived representative agents index by \( i \) are born with total initial size \( N_0 = 1 \), which grows exogenously at time varying rate \( n_t \). Each period the heterogeneous households earn a deterministic labour income, stochastic returns on physical capital holdings from owning firms and risk-free returns from owning bonds.

2.2 Production

2.2.1 Final Good Production

The final output good \( Y_t \) is composed of two intermediate goods produced in a clean and a dirty sector \( Y_{ts}, s \in \{c\}, \{d\} \), and augmented according to a CES aggregator with substitution elasticity \( \varepsilon \). At this outer layer of the production side we further assume an exogenous technology level \( \Upsilon_t \), which grows at the exogenous rate \( g \). Additionally, there is a negative aggregation production externality \( D_t \) from air pollution which proportionally reduces aggregate output and thus

\[
Y_t = (1 - D_t) \cdot \Upsilon_t \cdot \left( \sum_{s \in \{c, d\}} \kappa_s Y_{ts}^{1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \varepsilon}},
\]

where \( \kappa_s \) are the sectoral output shares with \( \sum_{s \in \{c, d\}} \kappa_s = 1 \). The representative firm takes as given the final goods price \( p_t \) and the intermediate goods input prices \( p_{ts} \) and maximizes profits under perfect competition giving the intermediate goods demand

\[
Y_{ts} = \left( \frac{\kappa_s}{p_{ts}} \right)^\varepsilon ((1 - D_t) \cdot \Upsilon_t)^{-1} Y_t, \text{ for } s \in \{c, d\}.
\]

and the price index for the final good as

\[
p_t = \frac{1}{(1 - D_t)\Upsilon_t} \left( \sum_{s \in \{c, d\}} \kappa_s p_{ts}^{1 - \varepsilon} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \varepsilon}},
\]

cf. Appendix A.1.

2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Production

Every household runs the two intermediate goods firms \( s \) by employing its own household capital \( k_{tis} \) and hiring labour \( \ell_{tis} \) and energy \( e_{tis} \) on the respective labour and energy markets. Production of intermediates goods takes place according to a two-nests Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy with inner nest capital elasticity parameter $\alpha$ and outer nest energy elasticity $1 - \gamma$. The value of the capital employed in production is subject to an idiosyncratic sector specific shock $\zeta_{tis}$ so that gross output is

$$y_{tis} = \psi_s \left[ (k_{tis})^\alpha (\ell_{tis})^{1-\alpha} \right]^\gamma \cdot e_{tis}^{1-\gamma} + \zeta_{tis} k_{tis},$$

where $\psi_s$ is a technology level parameter. We assume that $\zeta_{tis}$ is i.i.d. with CDF $\Psi \left( 0, \sigma^2_s, \ldots \right)$, with details on the shock distribution described in Appendix A.2. Households take as given the intermediate goods prices $p_{ts}$, wages, respectively the return on labour, $r_t^l$, energy prices $p_{e}^{ts}$ and an exogenous depreciation rate on capital $\delta_s$ so that profits are

$$\pi_{tis} = p_{ts} \cdot y_{tis} - r_t^l \ell_{tis} - p_{e}^{ts} e_{tis} - \delta_s k_{tis}.$$  

Assuming free entry and exit, profit maximization yields the demand for energy and labour as

$$e_{tis} = \Gamma(\psi_s, \alpha, \gamma) \cdot \frac{1 - \gamma}{(1 - \alpha) \gamma} \cdot \left( \frac{r_t^l}{p_{ts}} \right)^{-\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot \left( \frac{p_{e}^{ts}}{p_{ts}} \right)^{-\frac{1-\gamma(1-\alpha)}{\alpha \gamma}} \cdot k_{tis},$$

$$\ell_{tis} = \Gamma(\psi_s, \alpha, \gamma) \cdot \left( \frac{r_t^l}{p_{ts}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \cdot \left( \frac{p_{e}^{ts}}{p_{ts}} \right)^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\alpha \gamma}} \cdot k_{tis},$$

where the constant $\Gamma(\psi_s, \alpha, \gamma)$ is

$$\Gamma(\psi_s, \alpha, \gamma) = \left[ \psi_s (1 - \gamma) \right]^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\alpha \gamma}} \cdot \left[ \psi_s (1 - \alpha) \gamma \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}.$$  

Using (5) in (3) we can rewrite output as

$$y_{tis} = \Gamma(\psi_s, \alpha, \gamma) \cdot \frac{1}{(1 - \alpha) \gamma} \cdot \left( \frac{r_t^l}{p_{ts}} \right)^{-\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot \left( \frac{p_{e}^{ts}}{p_{ts}} \right)^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\alpha \gamma}} \cdot k_{tis} + \zeta_{tis}$$

which is linearly increasing in $k_{tis}$ and, using this in (4) gives profits as

$$\pi_{tis} = \left[ \Gamma(\psi_s, \alpha, \gamma) \cdot \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \alpha)} \cdot p_{ts} \left( \frac{r_t^l}{p_{ts}} \right)^{-\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot \left( \frac{p_{e}^{ts}}{p_{ts}} \right)^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\alpha \gamma}} - \delta_s + p_{ts} \zeta_{tis} \right] k_{tis},$$

which are proportional to $k_{tis}$. Defining the idiosyncratic return on capital as

$$r_{tis} = \Gamma(\psi_s, \alpha, \gamma) \cdot \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \alpha)} \cdot p_{ts} \left( \frac{r_t^l}{p_{ts}} \right)^{-\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot \left( \frac{p_{e}^{ts}}{p_{ts}} \right)^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\alpha \gamma}} - \delta_s + p_{ts} \zeta_{tis}.$$
we can thus rewrite profits as

$$\pi_{tis}(k_{tis}) = r_{tis} \cdot k_{tis}. \tag{9}$$

### 2.2.3 Energy Production

Energy employed for production in the two intermediate goods sectors $s$ is produced in two perfectly separated (across the two sectors) energy producing firms that employ labour $L^e_{tis}$ and an a technology stock $\Upsilon^e_{tis}$, which grows exogenously and deterministically at the sector specific rates $g_s$. The energy production technology is linear and accordingly

$$E_{ts} = \Upsilon^e_{ts} L^e_{ts}.$$

Dirty energy production is subject to proportional carbon taxes $\tau^e_{ts=di} \geq 0$, whereas energy in the clean sector is untaxed, $\tau^e_{ts=cl} = 0$, and thus profits in the two energy producing firms are

$$\pi^e_{ts} = p^e_{ts} (1 - \tau^e_{ts}) \Upsilon^e_{ts} L^e_{ts} - r^l L^e_{ts}.$$ 

Assuming free entry and exit drives profits in the energy sector to zero and thus energy prices are given by

$$p^e_{ts} = \frac{r^l}{(1 - \tau^e_{ts}) \Upsilon^e_{ts}}. \tag{10}$$

### 2.3 Carbon Stock Accumulation, Temperature and the Damage Function

As in Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2014) and Kotlikoff, Kubler, Polbin, Sachs, and Scheidegger (2019), the total carbon stock $S_t$ in the atmosphere is composed of two stocks, a rapidly and a slowly depreciating stock, $S_{tc}$ for $c \in \{ra, sl\}$, thus

$$S_t = \sum_{c \in \{ra, sl\}} S_{tc}$$

which accumulate through dirty energy emissions and feature persistence parameter $\rho_c$, where $1 > \rho_{c=sl} > \rho_{c=ra} > 0$, thus

$$S_{tc} = \phi_c \xi E_{ts=di} + \rho_c S_{t-1c} \tag{11}$$


where $\xi > 0$ and $\phi_c > 0$ and $\sum_{c \in \{ra, st\}} \phi_c = 1$. Each unit of $S_t$ leads to an increase of the global temperature according to

$$T_t = \lambda \frac{\log(S_t / S_{pre})}{\log(2)},$$

(12)

where $S_{pre}$ is the pre-industrial area carbon stock in the atmosphere, and $\lambda > 0$. The temperature increase in turn leads to the negative externality on aggregate output through the damage function

$$D_t = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + \nu T_t^2},$$

(13)

for $\nu > 0$.

2.4 Fiscal and Monetary Authorities

The model features a fiscal and a monetary authority. The fiscal authority levies Carbon taxes at rates $\tau_{ts=di} \geq 0$ and receives profits from the monetary authority $\pi^m_t$. These sources of income are distributed to households in the form of subsidies on consumption, $\tau^c_t \leq 0$ and thus each period the fiscal authority features a balanced budget of

$$\tau^c_{ts=di} E_{ts=di} + \pi^m_t + \tau^c_t C_t = 0.$$  

(14)

The monetary authority in turn holds an exogenous amount of capital $K^m_t$ in the economy which is growing at exogenous time varying rate $g^m_t \geq 0$. This capital is exogenously split across the two capital stocks in the intermediate goods production sectors, thus

$$K^m_t = \sum_{s \in \{cl,di\}} K^m_{ts}. $$

The monetary authority earns the average marginal products in the two sectors and its profits are thus

$$\pi^m_t = \sum_{s \in \{cl, di\}} E[r_{ts}] K^m_{ts}. $$

2.5 Households

2.5.1 Preferences

Each household $i$ at time $t$ has Epstein-Zin-Weil (Epstein and Zin 1989; Epstein and Zin 1991; Weil 1989) recursive preferences $u_{ti}$ over consumption $c_{ti}$ and continuation utility $u_{t+1i}$ which is discounted at factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$ and features risk aversion parameterized by $\theta$ and resistance to
intertemporal substitution $v$. Thus, preferences are given by

$$u_{ti} = \left[c_{ti}^{1-v} + \beta \cdot \left(\mathbb{E}[u_{t+1i}]^{1-v}\right)^{1-v}\right]^{1+v}, \quad (15)$$

where $\mathbb{E}$ is an expectations operator with expectations taken with respect to idiosyncratic shocks to the return on physical capital.

### 2.5.2 Endowments

Household operate the two intermediate goods firms. Accordingly, household $i$ enters into model period $t$ with capital stocks $k_{tis}$ in the two firms and earns in the current period stochastic profits generated from production in those firms $\pi_{tis}$. Households also earn a deterministic labour income $r_t^l\ell_t$ where $r_t^l$ denotes the wage rate on the exogenous labour endowment $\ell_t$, which is the same for all households. Furthermore, households enter the period with bond holdings $b_{ti}$, which are in zero net supply across all households and earn a risk-free return $r_t^f$. The household spends its income from these sources on consumption of the final good $c_t$—which has price $p_t$ and is taxed, respectively subsidized, at rate $\tau_t^c$—, on savings in the two capital goods $k_{t+1is}$ as well as on risk free bond purchases $b_{t+1i}$. Thus the dynamic household budget constraint of household $i$ is

$$\sum_{s \in \{c,d\}} k_{t+1is} + b_{t+1i} + (1 + r_t^c)p_t c_{ti} = \sum_{s \in \{c,d\}} k_{tis} (1 + r_{tis}) + (1 + r_t^f)b_{ti} + r_t^l\ell_t$$

where $r_{tjs} = \frac{\pi_{tis}}{k_{tis}}$ is the stochastic return on capital in sector $s$.

### 2.5.3 Analysis of the Household Problem

Conditional on the aggregate law of motion of the economy, i.e., for given prices, wages, interest rates and taxes, the household model permits a closed form solution. To derive it, first rewrite the budget constraint in terms of cash-on-hand

$$x_{ti} = \sum_{s \in \{c,d\}} k_{tis} (1 + r_{tis}) + (1 + r_t^f)b_{ti} + r_t^l\ell_t$$

to get

$$\sum_{s \in \{c,d\}} k_{t+1is} + b_{t+1i} = x_{ti} - (1 + r_t^c)p_t c_{ti}.$$
Next, define the portfolio shares as shares invested in the respective asset as a function of total savings \( x_{ti} = (1 - \tau^c_t) c_{ti} \) as

\[
\alpha_{tis} = \frac{k_{t+1is}}{x_{ti} - (1 + \tau^c_t)p_tC_{ti}}, \quad 1 - \sum_{s \in \{c, d\}} \alpha_{tis} = \frac{b_{t+1is}}{x_{ti} - (1 + \tau^c_t)p_tC_{ti}}
\]

to note that

\[
x_{t+1i} = \sum_{s \in \{c, d\}} \left( 1 + r^f_{t+1} + \alpha_{tis} \left( r_{t+1is} - r^f_{t+1} \right) \right) (x_{ti} - (1 + \tau^c_t)p_tC_{ti}) + r^l_{t+1}\ell_{t+1}.
\] (16)

Next, denote by \( h_t \) the human capital wealth of a household at date \( t \), which is the discounted sum of future labour income

\[
h_t = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} r^f_{t+1+j}\ell_{t+1+j} \prod_{k=0}^{j} \left( 1 + r^f_{t+k+1} \right)^{-1}
\]

which thus obeys the human capital accumulation equation

\[
h_{t+1} = h_t (1 + r^f_{t+1}) - r^l_{t+1}\ell_{t+1}.
\] (17)

Finally, define total wealth of the household as

\[
w_{ti} = x_{ti} + h_t
\]

and take the sum of (16) and (17) to get

\[
w_{t+1i} = (w_{ti} - (1 - \tau^c_t)c_{ti}) R^p_{t+1i} \left( \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis} \}_{s \in \{c, d\}} \right),
\] (18)

where

\[
R^p_{t+1i} \left( \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis} \}_{s \in \{c, d\}} \right) = 1 + r^f_{t+1} + \sum_{s \in \{c, d\}} \hat{\alpha}_{tis} \left( r_{t+1is} - r^f_{t+1} \right)
\]
is a portfolio return on total savings \( w_{ti} - (1 - \tau^c_t)c_{ti} \) and where

\[
\hat{\alpha}_{tis} = \frac{k_{t+1is}}{w_{ti} - (1 + \tau^c_t)p_tC_{ti}}, \quad 1 - \sum_{s \in \{c, d\}} \hat{\alpha}_{tis} = \frac{b_{t+1is}}{w_{ti} - (1 + \tau^c_t)p_tC_{ti}}
\]

are the portfolio investments in the respective asset in relation to total savings.
Maximization of (15) subject to the resource constraint (18) gives rise to optimal decisions in terms of consumption policy functions and portfolio allocation decisions as stated in the next proposition, which we formally prove in Appendix A.3:

**Proposition 1.**

- Consumption policy functions are linear functions of total wealth

\[ c_{ti} = m_t w_{ti} \]

where the marginal propensities to consume are

\[ m_t = \frac{\Theta \left(p_t, p_{t+1}, \tau^c_t, \tau^c_{t+1}, R^p_{t+1} \left( \{\hat{\alpha}_{ts}\}_{s \in \{cl,di}\} \right), \beta, v, \theta, \Psi \right) m_{t+1i}}{1 + (1 + \tau^c_t)\Theta \left(p_t, p_{t+1}, \tau^c_t, \tau^c_{t+1}, R^p_{t+1} \left( \{\hat{\alpha}_{ts}\}_{s \in \{cl,di}\} \right), \beta, v, \theta, \Psi \right) m_{t+1i}}, \quad (19) \]

where

\[ \Theta \left(p_t, p_{t+1}, \tau^c_t, \tau^c_{t+1}, R^p_{t+1} \left( \{\hat{\alpha}_{ts}\}_{s \in \{cl,di}\} \right), \beta, v, \theta, \Psi \right) = \left( \frac{\beta}{p_t (1 + \tau^c_t)} \left( \mathbb{E}_t \left[ R^p_{t+1} \left( \{\hat{\alpha}_{ts}\}_{s \in \{cl,di}\} \right)^{1-\theta} \right] \right) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \]

- The optimal portfolio shares are given by

\[ \hat{\alpha}^s_{ts} \approx \frac{\ln(1 + \mathbb{E}[r_{t+1s}]) - \ln(1 + r^f_{t+1})}{\theta \cdot \text{Var}(\ln(1 + r_{t+1s}))}, \quad (20) \]

Thus, the marginal propensities to consume out of total wealth and the optimal portfolio shares in \( t, s \) are the same for all \( i \), \( m_{ti} = m_t \), \( \hat{\alpha}_{tis} = \hat{\alpha}_{ts} \). Linearity of policy functions in total wealth and identical marginal propensities to consume in any \( t, s \) across all households is a very convenient property of the model as it simplifies the aggregation to the effect that we only need to keep track in the mean decisions and not their distribution.

### 2.6 Definition of Equilibrium

We define the equilibrium in this economy sequentially. By the result in Proposition 1 we do not need to keep track of the distribution of heterogenous households and thus household specific variables are not indexed by \( i \) and it is understood that the household variables in the formal equilibrium definition indexed by \( t \), respectively by \( t \) and \( s \), refer to average allocations.

**Definition 1.** Given an initial total wealth level \( w_0 \), initial carbon stocks \( \{S_{0c}\}_{c \in \{ra,sl\}} \), a sequence of technology levels and of the population \( \{\Upsilon_t, \Upsilon^s_{ts}\}_{s \in \{cl,di\}, N_t \}_t^{\infty} \) and a sequence of policy parameters \( \{\tau^c_t, \tau^c_{t=di}, \{K^m_{ts}\}_{s \in \{cl,di\}}\}_t^{\infty} \), a competitive equilibrium is an allocation
\{E_{ts}, K_{ts}, L_{ts}, Y_{ts}, \hat{\alpha}_{ts}\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}} \in \mathbb{R}^\infty, \{x_{t+1}, h_{t+1}, w_{t+1}, S_t, T_t, D_t\}_t \in \mathbb{R}^\infty, a sequence of prices
\{p_t, \hat{p}_t, r_t\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}} \in \mathbb{R}^\infty and a sequence of profits \{\pi_t, \pi^m_t\}_{t \in \mathbb{R}^\infty} such that

1. given prices \{p_t, \hat{p}_t, r_t\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}} and policies \{\tau^c_t, \tau^e_t\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}}, \{\pi^m_t\}_{t \in \mathbb{R}^\infty} house-
holds behave optimally with resulting optimal policy functions for choices \(c_t, \hat{\alpha}_t, w_{t+1}\) as
characterized in Proposition 1.

2. prices satisfy (5), (10) and
\[ r_{ts} = \int r_{tis} \, di \]
where \(r_{tis}\) is given in (8);

3. the government budget constraint (14) holds in all \(t \geq 0\);

4. the sequence of carbon stocks, global temperature and global damage \{S_t\}_{c \in \{ra, sl\}}, T_t, D_t \in \mathbb{R}^\infty evolve according to (11)–(13);

5. markets clear:
\[
\begin{align*}
L_t &= N_t \ell_t \quad (21a) \\
K_{ts} &= N_t \int k_{tsi} \, di, \text{ for } s \in \{cl, di\} \\
B_t &= N_t \int b_{ts} \, di = 0 \\
L_{ts} &= N_t \int \ell_{tsi} \, di = N_t \cdot \Gamma(\psi_s, \alpha, \gamma) \cdot \left(\frac{r^l_t}{p_{ts}}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \cdot \left(\frac{\hat{p}_{ts}^c}{p_{ts}}\right)^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\alpha \gamma}} \cdot K_{ts}, \text{ for } s \in \{cl, di\} \\
E_{ts} &= N_t \int e_{tsi} \, di = N_t \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \gamma}{1 - \alpha} \gamma\right) \cdot \frac{1}{(1 - \alpha) \gamma} \cdot \left(\frac{r^l_t}{p_{ts}}\right)^{-\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha \gamma}} \cdot \left(\frac{\hat{p}_{ts}^c}{p_{ts}}\right)^{-\frac{1-\gamma(1-\alpha)}{\alpha \gamma}} \cdot K_{ts}, \\
Y_{ts} &= N_t \int y^X_{t,j,i} \, di = N_t \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \gamma}{1 - \alpha} \gamma\right) \cdot \frac{1}{(1 - \alpha) \gamma} \cdot \left(\frac{r^l_t}{p_{ts}}\right)^{-\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha \gamma}} \cdot \left(\frac{\hat{p}_{ts}^c}{p_{ts}}\right)^{-\frac{1-\gamma(1-\alpha)}{\alpha \gamma}} \cdot K_{ts},
\end{align*}
\]
where \(\Gamma(\psi_s, \alpha, \gamma)\) is given in (6).
3 Calibration and Experiments

3.1 Overview of Calibration

We calibrate the model by fixing some parameters exogenously (first stage parameters) and by calibrating others to match selected moments in an initial steady state year, which we pick to be year 2010. While the latter set of parameters are calibrated jointly, for clarity of identification of the parameter values we relate each parameter with a specific target. Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of all first- and second-stage parameters and the subsequent sections provide the details of the calibration by sector in the economy.

Table 2: Calibration: First Stage Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Target (Source)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population and labour supply</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial population size $N_0$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Data moment (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial population growth rate $n_0$</td>
<td>0.0121</td>
<td>Data moment (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial working age population ratio $\omega_0$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Constant (baseline)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final good technology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elast. of subst. $\varepsilon$</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Elasticity of energy subst. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediate good technology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-energy share: $\gamma$</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>Kotlikoff et al. (2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital share: $\alpha$</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Standard value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Climate Module</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial carbon stock: $S_0$</td>
<td>802 GtC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-industrial carbon stock: $S_{pre}$</td>
<td>581 GtC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock 1 share: $\phi_s$</td>
<td>[0.5,0.5]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emission share in atmosphere: $\xi$</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon stock persistence: $\rho_c$</td>
<td>$[0.996,0.999]$, $c \in {ra, sl}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp. increase with $S$: $\lambda$</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperature to damage: $\nu$</td>
<td>0.0028388</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity inter-temp. substit., $1/\upsilon$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Standard value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Calibration in the baseline model. First stage parameters calibrated with reference to other studies or without using the model. Steady state year is year 2010.

3.2 Population and Labour Supply

The exogenous initial size of the population $N_0$ is normalized to one. The population growth rate $n_t$ and the working age population ratio (WAPR) $\omega_t$ are calibrated from the population growth rate information (and projections) provided in the World Population Prospects of the
Table 3: Calibration: Second Stage Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Moment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final good technology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interm. good weight, $\kappa_s, s \in {cl, di}$</td>
<td>0.45, 0.55</td>
<td>$E_{0s=di}/E_{0s=cl} = 4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate final good TFP, $g$</td>
<td>0.0098</td>
<td>$(\frac{Y_{2100}}{L_{2100}} / \frac{Y_{2020}}{L_{2020}})^{1/n} - 1 = 1.50%$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediate good technology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interm. productivity factor: $\psi_{s=cl} = \psi_{s=di}$</td>
<td>4811</td>
<td>$E_{0s=di} = 30$ GtCO2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected depreciation rate: $\delta_s, s \in {cl, di}$</td>
<td>0.015, 0.087</td>
<td>$\mathbb{E}[\tau_{0s}] = 6.94%, s \in {cl, di}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. of depreciation shock: $\sigma_s, s \in {cl, di}$</td>
<td>0.030, 0.021</td>
<td>$\sigma^{T_o}_{s} = 8.4%, s \in {cl, di}$ (std. of capital returns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Energy production technology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean productivity factor, $\Upsilon^c_{0s=cl}$</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>$p_{0s=cl}^c = 810$ USD/tC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirty productivity factor, $\Upsilon^d_{0s=di}$</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>$p_{0s=di}^c = 540$ USD/tCe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate clean prod. fact., $g^c_{s=cl}$</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>$(p_{2100s=cl}^c / p_{2020s=cl}^c)^{1/n} - 1 = -0.50%$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate dirty prod. fact., $g^d_{s=di}$</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>$(E_{2015s=di} / E_{2010s=di})^{1} - 1 = -0.50%$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time discount factor: $\beta$</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>$K/Y = 2.5$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative risk aversion: $\theta$</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>$r^{f} = 2.9%$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central bank portfolio</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital holdings, $K_{0s}^m, s \in {cl, di}$</td>
<td>[6244, 8930]</td>
<td>$K_{0s}^m/K_{0s} = 4%, s \in {cl, di}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Calibration in the baseline model. Second stage parameters calibrated endogenously by matching of moments. Steady state year is year 2010.
United Nations. The initial year 2010 population growth rate is $n_0 = 0.0121$ and population growth shrinks gradually to reach zero growth by year 2100 thus $n_t = 0$, for all $t > 90$. Aggregate labour in the model is $L_t = \omega_t N_t$. In our baseline scenario, we abstract from time variation in the working age population ratio by letting $\omega_t = \omega_0$ (which we normalize to 1 in the base year) and thus the aggregate of labour grows at the same rate as the population. As a sensitivity analysis, we further consider a scenario where we feed into the model a time varying working age population ratio. Figure 2 displays the evolution of aggregate population size in panel (a) and the working age population ratio in panel (b), from year 2015 to year 2100. Population features a gradually decreasing growth rate and is thus hump-shaped over the next 80 years. This reflects the increase in the world population from 7.8 Billion in year 2020 to about 10.9 Billion people in year 2100 according to the median variant of the UN projections. In the baseline calibration WAPR is held fixed at one, while in the sensitivity analysis it gradually decreases which reflects the increasing dependency of the population, which we measure by calibrating the working age population ratio as the (appropriately normalized) inverse of the total dependency ratio.

Figure 2: Population and Working age population ratio

Notes: Aggregate population size in panel (a) and working age population ratio (WAPR) in panel (b). Panel (b) shows WAPR in the baseline setup (held constant at one) and as used in sensitivity analysis WAPR. Population size in baseline and sensitivity setup and WAPR in case of the sensitivity setup correspond to the median variant of the UN projections.

3.3 Production

Final Good Production We take an indirect approach to the calibration of the parameter governing the elasticity of final output in the two goods, $Y_{ts}$, $s \in \{cl, di\}$ in equation (1). In our model with the two separate firms for energy production there is no direct parameter that would govern the demand elasticity for energy, which we in turn refer to as the percent change in the
ratio of dirty to clean energy demand $E_{ts}^{d} = E_{ts}^{c}$ in response to a percent change of relative prices $p_{Ets}^{d} / p_{Ets}^{c}$ denoted as $\eta_{Ets}^{d} / \eta_{Ets}^{c}$. This elasticity is a key statistic in our model for the response of energy use induced by exogenous price changes through carbon taxes. According to Papageorgiou, Saam, and Schulte (2017) the energy demand elasticity is about 2-3, where the lower value refers to the electricity-generating sector and values close to 3 are in nonenergy industries. We take the lower value as target for the calibration of parameter $\varepsilon$. In appendix B.1 we derive that locally—i.e., holding constant the (expected) marginal remuneration of capital $E_{ts}^{s} \in \{cl, di\}$ and labour $r_{t}^{l}$—the energy demand elasticity is given by

$$\eta_{Ets}^{d} / \eta_{Ets}^{c} = \varepsilon \cdot (1 - \gamma) + \gamma$$

which we invert to calibrate $\varepsilon$ for given target $\eta_{Ets}^{d} / \eta_{Ets}^{c}$ and a given $\gamma$.

The relative weights on the two goods in (1), $\kappa_{s}, s \in \{cl, di\}$ are calibrated such that (i) we normalize $\kappa_{s=di} = 1 - \kappa_{s=cl}$ and (ii) match the ratio of energy output in the two sectors of $E_{ts}^{d} / E_{ts}^{c} = 4$ giving $\kappa_{s=cl} = 0.45$ and thus $\kappa_{s=di} = 0.55$. The final good output growth rate $g$ is calibrated to generate a total annual output growth of 1.5% in the period from year 2020 to year 2100, giving $g = 0.0098$.

**Intermediate Goods Production** We set the production elasticity of capital employed in the intermediate goods sectors, cf. equation (3), exogenously to $\alpha = 0.33$, corresponding to standard estimates of capital elasticities in production. The output elasticity parameter of non-energy inputs $\gamma$ is set to 0.96, following Kotlikoff, Kubler, Polbin, Sachs, and Scheidegger (2019). The technology levels in both sectors are normalized such that $\psi_{cl} = \psi_{di}$ and calibrated to generate dirty energy production of 30 gigatons of CO2 in the initial steady state equilibrium.

The average depreciation rates $\delta_{s}, s \in \{c, d\}$ and the standard deviation of depreciations shocks $\sigma_{s}^{s}, s \in \{c, d\}$ are calibrated to yield expected average returns of 6.94% in both sectors and a standard deviation of expected returns of 8.4%, based on empirical estimates of Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007). This gives $\delta_{s} = [0.015, 0.087], s \in \{cl, di\}$

**Energy Production** Recall from equation (10) that energy prices are inversely proportional to the technology level in the energy sector. Based on this relationship we calibrate the technology parameters $\Upsilon_{0s}^{e}, s \in \{cl, di\}$ to match the absolute price levels\(^6\) in the two sectors per ton of carbon emission ($tCe$) of USD 810, respectively 540, which requires $\Upsilon_{0s=cl}^{e} = 128$ and $\Upsilon_{0s=di}^{e} = 192$. We denote by $g_{s}^{e}$ the time constant growth rates in the two sectors, i.e., $\Upsilon_{ts}^{e} = \Upsilon_{t-1s}^{e}(1 + g_{s}^{e})$. We endogenously determine the growth rate in the clean energy sector $g_{s=cl}^{e}$ such that energy

\(^6\)Recall that final consumption is the numeraire good in the economy so that these absolute price levels are equal to the relative prices in units of the final consumption good.
prices fall by 0.5\% on average over the 80 years between year 2020 and 2100. This calibration is based on Nordhaus (2017a), also see Kotlikoff, Kubler, Polbin, Sachs, and Scheidegger (2019). We endogenously determine the growth rate in the dirty energy sector \( g_{d} \) such that CO2 emissions relative to GDP reduce at a rate of \(-0.5\%\) annually over the period from year 2020 to 2035, which corresponds to the average value of the share of CO2 emissions relative to world GDP over the period 1995 to 2018 as measured in PPP units at constant prices, which we compute from World Bank (2021). Our calibration gives \( g = [0.010, 0.011] \) for the two clean and dirty energy sector growth rates, respectively.

### 3.4 Household Preferences

The elasticity of inter-temporal substitution \( 1/\upsilon = 0.5 \), corresponding to the standard estimate in the literature. The remaining household preference parameters are calibrated endogenously to match a capital output ratio of 3 by choice of the discount factor, which gives \( \beta = 0.997 \), and a risk-free rate of return of 2.9\% by choice of the coefficient of risk aversion which requires \( \theta = 63.9 \). This high value is not surprising because shocks in our model are assumed to be distributed as log-normal (thus, there are no extreme events), and there are no additional income shocks (no background risks) for households.

### 3.5 Carbon Stock Accumulation, Temperature and the Damage Function


**Carbon Stock** The initial carbon stock in the atmosphere is set to \( S_0 = 802 \) gigatons of carbon, where \( S_{0c=sl} = 684 \) GtC and \( S_{0c=ra} = 118 \) GtC. As to the dynamics of the two carbon stocks in equation (11) we assume that 40\% of dirty energy output leads to an accumulation of the carbon stocks and thus \( \xi = 0.4 \), which is split up equally across the two stocks, thus \( \phi_c = 0.5, c \in \{sl, ra\} \). The slow decumulating carbon stock features a persistence of \( \rho_{c=sl} = 0.999 \), and the rapidly decumulating of \( \rho_{c=ra} = 0.995 \).

**Temperature and Damage Function** We calibrate the temperature function in (12) by setting \( \lambda = 3 \) and \( S_{pre} = 581 \), and the damage function in (13) by letting \( \nu = 0.0028388 \).

### 3.6 Fiscal and Monetary Authorities

**Monetary Authority** The monetary authority’s portfolio is calibrated such that in the initial steady state 4\% of capital in both sectors is held directly by the monetary authority, i.e., \( \frac{K^m_{cl}}{K_s} = 0.04 \) for \( s \in \{cl, di\} \). Given the endogenously determined sizes of the two sectors in the economy, this requires \( K^m_{0s=cl} = 6244 \) and \( K^m_{0s=di} = 8930 \). In our baseline experiment, we hold the shares constant, i.e., \( \frac{K^m_{t} s}{K_s} = 0.04 \) for \( s \in \{cl, di\} \) for all \( t > 0 \), so that the wealth holdings of the monetary authority grow with the capital stock of the economy.
Fiscal Authority  In the initial steady state equilibrium, the fiscal authority is inactive, thus \( \tau_{t_0}^c = \tau_t^c = 0 \).

### 3.7 Thought Experiments

Taking as given exogenous dynamics of population and technology, we compute transitions under alternative fiscal and monetary policy scenarios. Throughout, we compute transitions over 200 model periods, starting in year 2010 with an initial steady state.\(^7\) We treat the first 10 years as a phase-in period and show results until 2100, that is overall we will focus on the evolution of key model outcome variables for the next 80 years from 2020-2100.

First, we conduct a *baseline experiment*, where all policy parameters are held constant at their respective 2010 values, that is the initial carbon tax is zero and the capital allocation of the monetary authority relative to the total capital stock is held constant and in equal proportion across the two sectors. Thus, in our baseline experiment, the claims on private capital held by the monetary authority grows with the time varying growth rate of the aggregate capital stock. This assumption can be interpreted as approximating a real world economy in which asset purchases by the monetary authority take place with a certain regularity. Our economy does not feature aggregate risk and thus there are no recessions, which would endogenously lead to repeated non-standard monetary policy interventions (QE) if a zero lower bound on interest rates becomes binding. Since two of the worldwide secular economic mega-trends—demographic change and climate change—will likely lead to a persistently low interest rate environment, it is not unlikely that such unconventional monetary policies will be implemented again in future recessions.\(^8\) Next, we consider a *carbon tax* policy reform scenario where the carbon tax is assumed to increase. Revenue from carbon taxation is redistributed to households through consumption subsidies.

In our second policy reform scenario, the *green QE* scenario, the portfolio composition of the monetary authority changes such that it reshuffles all of its capital holdings towards the green sector. By our assumption of a growing asset stock held by the monetary authority we give green QE a maximum potency through the reallocation of these growing asset holdings towards the green intermediate goods sector.

We further assume that, first, the monetary authority’s private asset portfolio holdings are relatively large, second, all countries in the world execute QE policies, third, clean and dirty asset returns are uncorrelated so that the QE policy will not lead to a full crowding out of private clean capital investments and fourth, that the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty energy

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\(^7\)The model is closed by setting the final period equal to the final steady state.

\(^8\)Our simulations support this argument. We show that the risk-free interest rate features a gradual decline, which stems from the accumulating climate change damages suppressing aggregate productivity. This decline is reinforced in our sensitivity analysis when we model population aging through a gradual reduction of the working age population ratio.
production is relatively high so that the already large changes induced by green QE policies do have relatively mild price effects only, which in turn leads to low crowding out. Our results on the green QE experiment should therefore not be interpreted as providing a realistic quantitative assessment of green QE policies. We rather ask a hypothetical question, i.e., within the structure of our model we evaluate the maximum climate change mitigating potency of such policies.\footnote{However, note that within the structure of our model there is no role for a triggering mechanism of a form that private investors may follow the example of the monetary authority. If such a mechanism is at work in the real world, then we underestimate the role of green QE policies.}

Finally, as a full policy scenario we consider both instruments jointly and thereby investigate whether both policies are substitutes or complements in mitigating the adverse effects of climate change.

We complement our analyses by additional policy scenarios. First, we compute the size of the carbon tax it would take to achieve the same outcome in terms of a reduction of the worldwide temperature as achieved under the QE experiment. Second, we investigate the sensitivity of our main results with respect to key exogenous model parameters such as, e.g., the assumed trend growth of the stock of assets held by the monetary authority and the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty energy.

4 Main results

4.1 Climate Change with Constant Policies

Intermediate Goods Production Figure 3 displays prices in the clean and the dirty energy sector in panel (a). The increasing prices of dirty energy and the falling price of clean energy is a consequence of the calibrated increase of relative productivity in the clean energy sector. With regard to the ensuing dirty energy production and thus dirty emissions, two mechanisms are at work in the model. On the one hand, demand for goods through population growth and technological progress in the final goods sector will lead to an increase of harmful emissions, $E_{ts=dt}$. On the other hand, the technological progress in the clean sector $\Upsilon_{ts=cd}$ by increasing the relative price of dirty intermediate goods leads to a substitution of intermediate goods production towards the clean sector. Two forces lead to this substitution. The one is a reduction of demand for dirty energy in the intermediate goods sector. The second is a substitution towards clean intermediate goods in the production of the final good. Over our projection period, the first mechanism dominates. Consequently, dirty energy emissions are increasing over the entire period, but at a decreasing rate and clean energy emissions gain relative importance. Since by this gradual substitution the clean intermediate goods sector expands relative to the dirty sector, the aggregate input factors capital and labor in the economy are increasingly employed in the production of clean intermediate goods, cf. panels (c) and (d) of the figure.
Figure 3: Baseline: Intermediate Production Inputs

Notes: Intermediate production inputs: dirty energy emissions $E_{t_k=dt_i}$ in panel (a), carbon stocks $S_t$, $\{S_{tc}\}_{c \in \{ra, sl\}}$ in panel (b), world temperature $T_t$ in degree Celsius in panel (c), and aggregate damage $D_t$ (in percent) in panel (d).
Overall, these dynamic adjustments lead to an increase of the relative price of dirty intermediate inputs $\frac{p_{ts=di}}{p_{ts=cl}}$ by 1% and a reduction of relative output $\frac{y_{ts=di}}{y_{ts=cl}}$ by about $-27\%$, cf. Figure 4.

**Figure 4: Baseline: Intermediate Production Inputs**

![Graph showing the relative price of dirty to clean goods and the intermediate good input ratio over time.]

*Notes: Intermediate production: relative price of dirty to clean goods, $\frac{p_{ts=di}}{p_{ts=cl}}$ in panel (a), and relative intermediate goods output, $\frac{y_{ts=di}}{y_{ts=cl}}$ in panel (b).*

**Climate Implications** The implications of the above shown gradual substitution towards cleaner intermediate goods production for the global climate are shown in Figure 5, where Panel (a) shows the level of the emissions of the dirty sector $E_{ts=di}$. Panel (b) displays the resulting time paths of the carbon stocks that accumulate as a consequence of these emissions according to the calibrated process described in (11). By year 2100 the total carbon stock will have increased by about 63% relative to its year 2020 level. This leads to an increase of global temperature as shown in Panel (c). According to our model, the year 2020 temperature level is about 1.5 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial level. Observe that the initial level exceeds the current range of estimates by the IPCC (2021) of $0.9 - 1.3$ degrees slightly.\(^{10}\) According to our model, without policy intervention the global temperature will increase to about 3.5 degrees, an increase over 80 years by 2 degrees, or 0.025 degrees per year. The resulting damage, shown in Panel (d) of the figure in terms of a percent output loss increases from 0.6% in 2020 to 3.5% in 2100, a factor of 5.

\(^{10}\)This upward bias is a consequence of the climate module we adopt from Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2014) (GHKT). The annual variant of the GHKT model calibrated in Van Der Ploeg and Rezai (2021) also features a 1.5 degree increase in their baseline year 2010.
Figure 5: Baseline: Climate Variables

**E^D - CO2 emissions (GtC/year)**

**Carbon stock in (GtC)**

**T - Temp. increase compared to pre-industrial (°C)**

**D - Damage: Y = (1-D)^... (%)**

Notes: Climate variables: dirty energy emissions \( E_{ta=dt_i} \) in panel (a), carbon stocks \( S_t, \{S_{tc}\} \in \{ra,st\} \) in panel (b), world temperature \( T_t \) in degree Celsius in panel (c), and aggregate damage \( D_t \) (in percent) in panel (d).
4.2 Climate Change with Policy Intervention

We now analyze the two policy reform scenarios, the introduction of a carbon tax and a portfolio shift of the capital holdings by the monetary authority. We first study both policies in isolation before turning to a joint analysis.

Policies in Isolation Figure 6 shows the time path of the absolute amount of the carbon tax expressed in USD per ton of carbon in Panel (a). We assume it is introduced in year 2020 at a level of 50 US dollars per ton of carbon, corresponding to 13.6 USD per ton of CO2. Since the year 2020 price of dirty energy in our model is at 750 USD this corresponds to a tax rate of 6.6%. We hold this tax rate constant along the transition, \( \tau_{ts=di} = 0.066 \) which implies that the absolute amount of carbon taxation increases at the growth rate of the dirty energy price \( p\text{e}_{ts=di} \). By 2100 the absolute carbon tax reaches almost 70 USD per ton of carbon.

Panel (b) of the same figure shows the capital holdings of the monetary authority in the two sectors. We assume that in year 2020 there is a full shift towards capital holdings in the clean intermediate goods sector. While this is, of course, an extreme assumption, it enables us to investigate the effects of QE on climate change assuming a (hypothetical) situation where QE is at its maximum potency.

Figure 6: Reforms: Carbon Taxation and Portfolio Reallocation

Notes: Policy reforms: carbon tax (in US dollars) in panel (a) and portfolio allocation of monetary authority in panel (b).

Figure 7 shows the key outcome variables of our experiments, in terms of changes relative to the baseline path. Turning to the reduction of global temperature we observe from panel (c) that the global temperature reduction in the carbon tax experiment is about 4.3 times larger than through QE. Carbon taxes through changing the relative price of dirty energy lead to a reduction
of dirty energy production and thus a reduction of the increase in the global temperature through two mechanisms. First, the price increase leads to a substitution of dirty energy through clean energy in the production of intermediate goods, thus more clean intermediate goods are produced (supply side mechanism). Second, the price increase of dirty energy \( P_{ts=di} \) increases the price of the dirty intermediate good \( p_{ts=di} \) which leads to a substitution in the production of the final output away from dirty intermediate towards clean intermediate goods (demand side mechanism).

The portfolio reallocation of the monetary authority, in contrast, has a theoretically ambiguous effect on dirty energy demand. First, on impact, i.e., holding factor prices constant, a reduction of capital employed for production in the dirty intermediate goods sector and a simultaneous increase of capital in the clean intermediate goods sector increases the marginal return on capital in the dirty and decreases it in the clean energy sector. This leads to an adjustment of private capital, which is reallocated from clean to dirty intermediate goods production and thus the portfolio reallocation by the monetary authority leads to a partial crowding out of private capital in the clean intermediate goods production. Also, the increased rate of return on capital in the dirty intermediate goods production increases capital costs for the intermediate goods firms leading to a substitution from capital towards energy and labour employed in production. Thus, while output is reduced by the portfolio reallocation, which also reduces energy demand in the dirty intermediate goods sector, this reduction in energy demand is partially muted by a substitution towards energy in production. Additionally, the increased capital costs of the firm leads to an increase of the intermediate goods price \( p_{ts=di} \) which induces a substitution in the production of the final good towards the clean intermediate input and through this channel reduces the demand for energy. Quantitatively, it turns out that the energy demand reducing mechanisms dominate.

One key feature of the calibration of our two sector two physical assets model is the assumed zero correlation of the idiosyncratic returns across the two sectors. It implies that, out of portfolio choice motives, holding capital in both sectors will provide a hedge to financial investors. This explains why QE in our model is not neutral: a portfolio reallocation by the monetary authority towards the clean sector does not induce a perfect crowding out of private capital in the clean sector, but leads to a partial crowding out only. To illustrate the extend of this partial crowding out in our model, Figure 8 shows the allocation of capital in both sectors, by the monetary authority as dashed lines and by the private sector as solid lines. As a consequence of the portfolio reallocation, the monetary authority shifts its capital holding towards the clean sector. In response to this, private investors hold less capital in the clean sector, but this crowding out effect is much smaller than the additional capital held by the monetary authority in the clean sector. Likewise, the substitution of private investors into dirty capital holdings is smaller than the reduction of dirty capital holdings capital by the monetary authority. Thus the net effect on capital holdings is positive in the clean sector and negative in the dirty sector.
Figure 7: Reforms: Climate Variables

Notes: Policy reforms: dirty energy reduction relative to baseline in gigatons of carbon in panel (a), carbon stock reduction relative to baseline in gigatons of carbon in panel (b), temperature reduction in degrees of Celsius in panel (c), and damage reduction in percent in panel (d).
Equivalent Carbon Tax  From the above analysis we observe that QE has a much milder effect on key climate variables than carbon taxation. We can thus conclude that relative to carbon taxation green QE is a less efficient instrument to mitigate the adverse societal effects of climate change. To look at this inefficiency from a different perspective we next compute the carbon tax it would take to achieve the same effect as for the green QE policy. The corresponding carbon tax schedule is introduced in 2021 at some time constant carbon tax rate. The resulting equivalent carbon tax required to achieve in 2100 the same global temperature reduction as for the green QE policy in levels is only 11.06 USD per ton of carbon, corresponding to about 3 USD per ton of CO2.

Joint Policies  A closely related question is whether green QE can be used complementary to carbon taxes. We therefore next consider both instruments jointly with results displayed in Figure 9. This shows that green QE has an additional climate change mitigating effect when it comes on top of a carbon tax policy, see Panel (a) of the figure. Yet, the model results do not support a positive interaction of both policy instruments, see Panel (b). Thus, the climate change mitigating impact of carbon taxes would not be magnified when green QE is simultaneously at work. On the one hand, green QE alone leads to a reduction of the global temperature by 0.036 degrees Celsius. On the other hand, the joint effect of QE and a carbon tax relative to a scenario where carbon taxation is used in isolation implies a global temperature reduction of 0.035 degrees.

The reason for the absence of a positive interaction effect is the substitution of input factors due
to changes in the costs structure in production. Specifically, on the one hand, the carbon tax increases the cost of dirty energy, leading dirty firms to partially substitute energy with labour and capital. On the other hand, green QE by increasing the cost of dirty capital leads to a partial substitution of capital with labour and energy. In combination these effects partially offset each other.

Figure 9: Temperature Reduction with Both Policy Instruments

Notes: Policy reforms: Temperature compared to pre-industrial in degrees of Celsius in panel (a) for baseline, carbon tax, QE and carbon tax plus QE; panel (b) shows the temperature reduction from baseline to QE and from the carbon tax to the carbon tax plus QE.

4.3 Sensitivity Analyses

Finally, we investigate the sensitivity of our main findings with respect to some key model parameters or assumptions of the policy analyses. First, rather than assuming that the stock of assets held by the monetary authority is constant in relative amounts as in our main analysis, we assume that it is constant in absolute amounts so that over time the relative size of assets held by the monetary authority shrinks to zero. As shown in the third column of Table 4, green QE is now quite substantially less effective so that the effectiveness of the carbon tax is about 15 times larger.

Second, a key parameter in our model is the elasticity of final output in the two intermediate goods. Recall that for our main results we determine this parameter such that the resulting price elasticity of the ratio of energy use is $\eta = 2$, corresponding to empirical estimates ranging from 2 to 3. Column four of Table 4 reports the results if the elasticity were only equal to $\eta = 1$, which we achieve by assuming a Cobb-Douglas production of final output ($\varepsilon = 1$), cf. Appendix B.1. The effects of green QE are then substantially smaller, so that the effectiveness of the carbon tax is about 31 times larger. Despite the fact that clean and dirty energy might even be complements
over shorter time horizons, we would, however, argue that our baseline calibration gives realistic
orders of magnitudes. First, we the elasticity by explicitly targeting price elasticities of energy
demand. Second, ours is a long-run question and it is reasonable that elasticities of substitution
across goods are even close to perfect in the long-run.

Third, we feed into the model a time varying working age population ratio as described in our
calibration section 3. Now, in the baseline scenario without any adjustment of policy instruments,
the shrinking incomes per capita (because of the decreasing productive labor force relative to the
total population) imply lower dirty emissions so that the global temperature increases by less
until 2100. Consequently, also in the policy experiments both policy instruments are less potent
in reducing emissions and thereby in reducing the trend increase of the global temperature. We
still find that the effect of the carbon tax is about 4 times larger than the effect of green QE.

Fourth, we follow Nordhaus (2017b) and assume a faster rate of reduction of CO2 emissions
of 1.5% annually rather than 0.5%. This leads to a stronger price increase of dirty relative to
clean energy prices so that the gradual substitution towards clean intermediate goods is faster in
the baseline analysis and the global temperature thus increases by less. In the policy experiments
both instruments are now (again) less potent and the relative advantage of the carbon tax shrinks
to a factor of about 3.7, which is still substantially more effective than green QE.

Table 4: Sensitivity Analyses

<table>
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<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Flat QE</th>
<th>Low SE</th>
<th>WAPR</th>
<th>SCO2R</th>
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<td>3.539</td>
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<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Different calibrations for sensitivity analyses. Flat QE: Size of monetary authority’s balance sheet held
constant over time. Low SE: Low substitution elasticity $\varepsilon = 2.25$ such that energy elasticity is $\eta_{E_{t+1}} = \frac{\eta_{E_{t+1}}}{\eta_{E_{t+1}} + \varepsilon} = 1.05$. WAPR: time varying working age population ratio $\omega_t$. SCO2R: strong CO2 reduction in baseline such that
share of CO2 in GDP decreases at $-1.5\%$ annually.
5 Concluding Discussion

We develop and calibrate a two-sector (clean and dirty) integrated assessment model to study the roles of green quantitative easing and carbon taxation for mitigating global warming. Green quantitative easing is modelled through an exogenous portfolio reallocation by the monetary authority.

A key element of our model is differential and imperfectly correlated risky returns in the two sectors so that the assumed exogenous reallocation of capital does not lead to a perfect crowding out of private capital employed for production in the green sector.

We consider an ambitious green quantitative easing policy by assuming a complete reallocation of capital towards the clean sector instead of a proportional split between the clean and dirty sector. As our baseline carbon tax scenario we consider an introduction of a modest carbon tax of 50 USD per ton of carbon, which grows exogenously such that the ad valorem tax stays constant. Despite the ambitious calibration of green quantitative easing, its effects on the global temperature increase are much milder—by a factor of about 4—than the carbon tax. Put differently, it would tax a carbon tax of initially only 3 USD per ton of CO2 to achieve the same global temperature reduction.

We find that pursuing a green quantitative easing policy on top of the introduction of the carbon tax leads to an additional climate change mitigation. Thus, while the effects of green quantitative easing are rather mild, they can make a positive contribution in a world where fiscal policy instruments are in place. However, we do not find positive interaction effects. In fact, green quantitative easing has a larger effect if used in isolation than in combination with a carbon tax.

In our analysis, we treat the amount of assets held by the monetary authority as given and assume that it grows with the size of the economy. We thus assume that in a persistent low interest rate environment—which is an endogenous outcome of our model—the monetary authority will repetitively resort to asset purchases, which we do not explicitly model. Among various avenues, we leave for future research an extension of our model towards endogenous quantitative easing policies, which requires extending our model by adding aggregate shocks and an explicit role for (non-)conventional monetary policy. This would allow us to address the trade-off between undoing quantitative easing policies during economic booms and pursuing green quantitative easing to combat global warming.
References


Papoutsi, M., M. Piazzesi, and M. Schneider (2021). How unconventional is green monetary policy?


A Analytical Derivations and Proofs

A.1 Intermediate Goods Demand

The final representative firm operates under perfect competition maximizing

$$\max_{\{Y_{ts}\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}}} \left\{ p_t Y_t - \sum_{s \in \{cl, di\}} p_{ts} Y_{ts} \right\}$$

$$= \max_{\{Y_{ts}\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}}} \left\{ p_t \cdot (1 - D_t) \cdot \Upsilon_t \cdot \left( \sum_{s \in \{cl, di\}} \kappa_s Y_{ts}^{1-\frac{1}{2}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{2}}} - \sum_{s \in \{cl, di\}} p_{ts} Y_{ts} \right\}$$

which gives the price of intermediate good $s$ as

$$\frac{p_{ts}}{p_t} = \kappa_s \left( (1 - D_t) \cdot \Upsilon_t \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \left( \frac{Y_t}{Y_{ts}} \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon}{1-\frac{1}{2}}} \cdot \left( \frac{r_l t}{p_{ts}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\frac{1}{2}}} \cdot \frac{(r_{ts}^e - \delta_s p_{ts})^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot (\frac{\gamma}{\sigma_s})^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\alpha}}}.$$

and thus the intermediate goods demand

$$Y_{ts} = \left( \frac{\kappa_s}{p_{ts}} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \left( (1 - D_t) \cdot \Upsilon_t \right)^{\frac{1}{2-\frac{1}{2}}} Y_t, \text{ for } s \in \{cl, di\}.$$

and the price of the final good as

$$p_t = \frac{1}{(1 - D_t) \Upsilon_t} \left( \sum_{s \in \{cl, di\}} \kappa_s^{\frac{1}{2}} p_{ts} \right)^{-\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{2}}}.$$

A.2 The Shock Distribution

The distribution of $\zeta_{tis}$, $\Psi$ is defined implicitly via the distribution of the gross return on capital. The gross return on capital is assumed to be log-normally distributed with

$$\log (1 + r_{tis}) \sim \mathcal{N}\left( \log(1 + \mathbb{E}r_{tis}) - \frac{(\sigma_s^2)^2}{2}, (\sigma_s^2)^2 \right),$$

where

$$\mathbb{E}r_{tis} = \int \mathbb{E}r_{tis} di = $\Gamma(\psi_s, \alpha, \gamma) \cdot \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \alpha) \cdot p_{ts} \left( \frac{r_l t}{p_{ts}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\frac{1}{2}}} \cdot \left( \frac{p_{ts}^e}{p_{ts}} \right)^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\alpha}}} - \delta_s.$$
is the average marginal profit from an additional unit of capital. Given this distributional assumption we get $\text{Var}(r_{tis}) = (1 + \mathbb{E}r_{tis})^2 \cdot \exp \left( (\sigma^2) - 1 \right)$.

A.3 Proof of Proposition 1

The proof is by guess and verify using the method of undetermined coefficients. We start by showing linearity of policy functions in total wealth, which differs across all $i$ through optimal portfolio shares $\hat{\alpha}_{tis}^*$. In a second step we show that $\hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* = \hat{\alpha}_{tis}$ for all $i$ and thereby that $m_{tis}^* = m_{tis}$ for all $i$.

Proof. 1. Claims: The consumption policy function in each period $t$ for household $i$ is

$$c(w_{ti}) = m_{ti} w_{ti}$$

for some $m_{ti}$ and the associated value function is

$$U(w_{ti}) = \rho_{ti} w_{ti}$$

for some $\rho_{ti}$.

2. Induction step: In any period $t$ we get under the induction claim, writing $U(w_{ti}) = \rho_{ti} w_{ti}$

$$U(w_{ti}) = \max_{c_{ti}, \hat{\alpha}_{ti}} \left\{ \left( c_{ti}^{1-v} + \beta \left( \mathbb{E}t \left[ (\rho_{t+1i} w_{ti} - (1 + \tau_{t}^c) p_t c_{ti}) R_{t+1i}^p \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* s \in \{cl, di\} \}^{1-\theta} \right] \right) \right)^{\frac{1-v}{1-\theta}} \right\}.$$

Using the resource constraint we get

$$U_{ti}(w_{ti}) = \max_{c_{ti}, \hat{\alpha}_{ti}, w_{t+1i}} \left\{ \left( c_{ti}^{1-v} + \beta \left( \mathbb{E}t \left[ (\rho_{t+1i} (w_{ti} - (1 + \tau_{t}^c) p_t c_{ti}) R_{t+1i}^p \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* s \in \{cl, di\} \}^{1-\theta} \right] \right) \right)^{\frac{1-v}{1-\theta}} \right\}$$

$$= \max_{c_{ti}, \hat{\alpha}_{ti}} \left\{ \left( c_{ti}^{1-v} + \beta (w_{ti} - (1 + \tau_{t}^c) p_t c_{ti}) \left( \mathbb{E}t \left[ (\rho_{t+1i} R_{t+1i}^p \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* s \in \{cl, di\} \})^{1-\theta} \right] \right) \right)^{\frac{1-v}{1-\theta}} \right\}$$

$$= \max_{c_{ti}, \hat{\alpha}_{ti}} \left\{ \left( c_{ti}^{1-v} + \beta (w_{ti} - (1 + \tau_{t}^c) p_t c_{ti}) \Lambda_{t+1i} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-v}} \right\}$$

where $\Lambda_{t+1i} \equiv \left( \mathbb{E}t \left[ (\rho_{t+1i} R_{t+1i}^p \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* s \in \{cl, di\} \})^{1-\theta} \right] \right)^{\frac{1-v}{1-\theta}}.$
Take the first-order condition w.r.t $c_t$ to obtain

$$c_t^{-\nu} = \beta (w_t - (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t c_t)^{-\nu} (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t \Lambda_{t+1}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow c_t = (w_t - (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t c_t) \Xi_{t+1}$$

for

$$\Xi_{t+1} = (\beta (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t \Lambda_{t+1})^{-\frac{1}{\nu}}$$,

and thus

$$c_t = m_t w_t$$

where

$$m_t = \frac{\Xi_{t+1}}{1 + (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t \Xi_{t+1}}$$

Use this back in the objective to get

$$U(w_t) = \left( (m_t w_t)^{1-\nu} + \beta \left( \mathbb{E}_t \left[ (\partial_{t+1}(1 - (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t m_t) w_t R_{t+1}^p \{\hat{\alpha_{t+1}^*} \}_{s \in \{cl, di\}} \right] \right) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\nu}}$$

$$= \left( (m_t)^{1-\nu} + \beta (1 - (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t m_t)^{1-\nu} \Lambda_{t+1} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\nu}}$$

$$= \left( \frac{\Xi_{t+1}}{1 + (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t \Xi_{t+1}} \right)^{1-\nu} + \frac{\Xi_{t+1}^{1-\nu}}{(1 + \tau_t^c)p_t} \left( \frac{1}{1 + (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t \Xi_{t+1}} \right)^{1-\nu}$$

$$= \left( \frac{\Xi_{t+1}^{1-\nu}}{1 + (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t \Xi_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\nu}} + \frac{\Xi_{t+1}^{1-\nu}}{(1 + \tau_t^c)p_t} \left( \frac{1}{1 + (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t \Xi_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\nu}}$$

$$= \frac{1}{(1 + \tau_t^c)p_t} \left( \frac{\Xi_{t+1}^{1-\nu}}{1 + (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t \Xi_{t+1}} \right) \frac{1}{1-\nu} w_t$$

$$= \frac{1}{(1 + \tau_t^c)p_t} \left( \frac{\Xi_{t+1}^{-\nu}}{1 + (1 + \tau_t^c)p_t \Xi_{t+1}} \right) \frac{1}{1-\nu} w_t$$

$$= \frac{1}{(1 + \tau_t^c)p_t m_t^{-\nu}} w_t.$$
We therefore get
\[ \theta_{ti} = \left( \frac{1}{(1 + \tau_t^c) p_t m_{ti}^{-\nu}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \nu}}, \]
which is non-stochastic, and we can accordingly rewrite \( \Lambda_{t+1i} \) as
\[ \Lambda_{t+1i} \equiv \frac{1}{(1 + \tau_{t+1}^c) p_{t+1} m_{t+1i}^{-\nu}} \left( \mathbb{E}_t \left[ R_{t+1}^p \left( \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* \}_{s \in \{ cl, di \}} \right)^{1-\theta} \right] \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}, \]
and thus
\[ \Xi_{t+1i} = \left( \beta \frac{(1 + \tau_t^c) p_t}{(1 + \tau_{t+1}^c) p_{t+1}} \left( \mathbb{E}_t \left[ R_{t+1}^p \left( \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* \}_{s \in \{ cl, di \}} \right)^{1-\theta} \right] \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\nu}} m_{t+1i} \]
\[ = \Theta \left( p_t, p_{t+1}, \tau_t^c, \tau_{t+1}^c, R_{t+1}^p \left( \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* \}_{s \in \{ cl, di \}} \right), \beta, \nu, \theta, \Psi \right) m_{t+1i} \]
and thus
\[ m_{ti} = \frac{\Theta \left( p_t, p_{t+1}, \tau_t^c, \tau_{t+1}^c, R_{t+1}^p \left( \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* \}_{s \in \{ cl, di \}} \right), \beta, \nu, \theta, \Psi \right) m_{t+1i}}{1 + (1 + \tau_t^c) \Theta \left( p_t, p_{t+1}, \tau_t^c, \tau_{t+1}^c, R_{t+1}^p \left( \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* \}_{s \in \{ cl, di \}} \right), \beta, \nu, \theta, \Psi \right) m_{t+1i}}. \]

3. Finally, from the FOC w.r.t. \( \hat{\alpha}_{tis} \) we get
\[ \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_t \left[ R_{t+1}^p \left( \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* \}_{s \in \{ cl, di \}} \right)^{1-\theta} \right]}{\partial \hat{\alpha}_{tis}} = 0 \]
and we thus get \( \hat{\alpha}_{tis} = \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* \) for all \( i \), which implies that \( m_{tis} = m_{ts} \) for all \( i \). Assuming that \( R_{t+1}^p \left( \{ \hat{\alpha}_{tis}^* \}_{s \in \{ cl, di \}} \right) \) is distributed as log-normal we get as an approximation applying results in Campbell and Viceira (2002) that under the assumed cross-sectional independence of the returns
\[ \hat{\alpha}_{ts}^* \approx \frac{\ln(1 + \mathbb{E}[r_{t+1s}]) - \ln(1 + r_{t+1}^f)}{\theta \cdot Var(\ln(1 + r_{t+1s}))}, \]
\[ \square \]
B Calibration Appendix

B.1 Output Elasticity $\varepsilon$ and Energy Elasticity $\eta$

Start from equation (8) and integrate out across all $i$ to get using $\mathbb{E}[\zeta_{tis}] = 0$ that

$$\mathbb{E}r_{ts} = \Gamma(\psi, \alpha, \gamma) \cdot \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \alpha)} \cdot p_{ts} \left( \frac{r^e_t}{p^e_{ts}} \right)^{\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot \left( \frac{p^e_{ts}}{p_{ts}} \right)^{\frac{1 - \gamma}{\alpha \gamma}} - \delta_s$$

from which we get

$$p_{ts} = \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha \Gamma(\psi, \alpha, \gamma)} \right)^{\alpha \gamma} \cdot (\mathbb{E}r_{ts} + \delta_s)^{\alpha \gamma} r^e_t (1 - \alpha) \gamma p^e_{ts}^{1 - \gamma}$$

(22)

and thus

$$\frac{p_{ts=cl}}{p_{ts=di}} = \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}r_{ts=cl} + \delta_{s=cl}}{\mathbb{E}r_{ts=di} + \delta_{s=di}} \right)^{\alpha \gamma} \left( \frac{p^e_{ts=cl}}{p^e_{ts=di}} \right)^{1 - \gamma}$$

(23)

From the demand for intermediate goods by the final firm (2) we get the intermediate goods demand ratio

$$\frac{Y_{ts=di}}{Y_{ts=cl}} = \left( \frac{\kappa_{s=di} p_{ts=cl}}{\kappa_{s=cl} p_{ts=di}} \right)^{\varepsilon}$$

(24)

Using (23) in the above we obtain

$$\frac{Y_{ts=di}}{Y_{ts=cl}} = \Xi \left( \{\mathbb{E}r_{ts}, \delta_s, \kappa_s\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}} \right) \left( \frac{p^e_{ts=cl}}{p^e_{ts=di}} \right)^{\varepsilon(1 - \gamma)}$$

(25)

for some time varying $\Xi \left( \{\mathbb{E}r_{ts}, \delta_s, \kappa_s\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}} \right)$.

Next, on the supply side for intermediate goods, we get from (21e) and (21f)

$$Y_{ts} = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \frac{p^e_{ts}}{p_{ts}} E_{ts}$$

and using (22) in the above we obtain

$$\frac{Y_{ts=di}}{Y_{ts=cl}} = \Lambda \left( \alpha, \gamma, \{\mathbb{E}r_{ts}, \delta_s, \Gamma(\psi, \alpha, \gamma)\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}}, r^e_t \right) \frac{p_{ts=cl}}{p_{ts=di}} - \gamma \frac{E_{ts=di}}{E_{ts=cl}}$$

(26)

for some time varying $\Lambda \left( \alpha, \gamma, \{\mathbb{E}r_{ts}, \delta_s, \Gamma(\psi, \alpha, \gamma)\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}}, r^e_t \right)$.

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Combining the intermediate goods demand and supply side, i.e., equations (25) and (26), we thus get

\[ \frac{E_{ts=di}}{E_{ts=cl}} = \frac{\Lambda(\alpha, \gamma, \{E_r, \delta_s, \Gamma(\psi_s, \alpha, \gamma)\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}}, r_I^l)}{\Xi(\{E_r', \delta_s', \kappa_s'\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}})} \left( \frac{p_{ts=cl}}{p_{ts=di}} \right)^{\varepsilon(1-\gamma)+\gamma}. \]  

(27)

Holding constant the (expected) returns \( \{E_r\}_{s \in \{cl, di\}} \), \( r_I^l \) we thus find that the energy demand elasticity is given by

\[ \eta_{E_{ts=di} / E_{ts=cl}, p_{ts=di} / p_{ts=cl}} = \varepsilon \cdot (1 - \gamma) + \gamma. \]

Observe that the energy elasticity is thus bounded from below by \( \gamma \) if the final output production features perfect complements (\( \varepsilon = 0 \)). Also note that it is equal to 1 if we assume Cobb-Douglas production of final output (\( \varepsilon = 1 \)).